

# The prospects and challenges of the Enhanced Transparency Framework as a driver of climate ambition

November 15, 2022

16:45 – 18:15, side-event room 9, COP27
















### Agenda

16:45 - 16:50	Welcome and Introduction  Moderator: Mr. Max van Deursen
	Presentations
	1. Transparency and climate action: Prof. Dr. Aarti Gupta (WUR)
16:50 - 17:50	2. Transparency and the Global Stocktake: Mr. R. R. Rashmi (TERI)
16:50 - 17:50	3. Transparency and capacity building: Dr. Masumur Rahman (SACEP)
	4. Transparency and equity: Emily Ojoo-Massawa (ARUA-CD/UCT)
	5. Transparency and climate finance: Dr. Romain Weikmans (FIIA/ULB)
	6. Transparency and gender: Dr. Laode M. Syarif (The Partnership)
17:50- 18:10	Question & Answer
18:10 - 18:15	Closing



# **Speakers**



Aarti Gupta
Wageningen
University & Research



Masumur Rahman South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP)



Romain Weikmans
Finnish Institute of
International Affairs (FIIA) and
ULB



R. R. Rashmi
The Energy and Resources
Institute (TERI)



Emily Ojoo-Massawa Mott MacDonald & African Climate and Development Initiative (ACDI)



Laode M. Syarif
Partnership for
Governance Reform
(Kemitraan)



## Aarti Gupta

Wageningen University & Research



#### 5-year research project TRANSGOV:

# Transforming climate governance through transparency?

**Aarti Gupta, Wageningen University** 



The 2015 Paris Agreement calls for an 'enhanced transparency framework' to make visible country climate actions

**Key assumptions:** Transparency will help enhance **accountability** and **mutual trust**, and thereby also stimulate **climate actions** 

#### But does transparency deliver on these promises?

- Very little empirical study: What are transparency's effects in practice? In UNFCCC context & in diverse national settings?
- Crucial to ask: Transparency gets <u>ever more attention</u> within UNFCCC and infrastructures of reporting & review are expanding!





### TRANSGOV: Key research themes



(1) Mapping nature and extent of country engagement in UNFCCC transparency arrangements



(3) Political effects of **capacity building** initiatives for climate transparency



(2) Analyzing effects on accountability, trust and ambition: transformative or a distraction or a site of politics?



(4) Transparency about climate finance: what are country reports making visible about finance provided and received?



(5) Impact of digitally-enabled radical transparency on multilateral climate politics and action?
e.g. Climate TRACE





## **Emerging findings**

#### Theme I: Are countries adhering to transparency obligations?

Article in Climate Policy developing a 'Transparency Adherence Index': showing that full (or lack) of adherence tells us relatively little about link to action

Open access: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/14693062.2021.1895705

#### Theme 3: Politics of capacity building for climate transparency

 Article in Climate Policy on political effects of capacity building for transparency: showing that priority is to build domestic capacity to report on GHG inventories
 mitigation actions (mandatory UNFCCC transparency requirements)

Open access: <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2021.1986364">https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14693062.2021.1986364</a>





# Research agenda: Where does the light shine?

#### Who is to be transparent about what:

- -> What: Politically negotiated narrow scope of transparency <u>prioritizes</u> reporting on emissions & mitigation (rather than adaptation, finance needed, L&D)
- -> Who: Burden of such 'enhanced' transparency more on developing countries (even those with very low emissions)

#### Transparency as a site of politics:

- Contestation: Contested political issues get hammered out in specific ways in seemingly technical transparency negotiations
- What's left in the dark: Comparative overview of whose actions are fair or ambitious (or how to assess this); production-side

Will transparency transform? And who benefits? Jury is still out!





# Our TRANSGOV team looks forward to furthering this research agenda, in collaboration with others!























# R. R. Rashmi


The Energy and Resources
Institute (TERI)






# Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) as building block to Global-Stock-take (GST)

# Transparency- ETF



Main transparency issues under negotiation at COP26 in Glasgow-

- Completion of modalities, procedures and guidelines for the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF)
- Support to developing country Parties to implement the ETF



# **Equity based ETF**

- Transparency in actions and support is the foundation of GST.
- Equity in all aspects of ETF is critical to raising ambition of GST-complaint actions.
- Information provided by parties should be country specific.
- Equity defines fairness in ambition and actions reported under ETF. Includes:
  - Analysis of fair share in the **provision** and **mobilization** of support, as well as the
  - Extent to which climate finance meets financial needs across countries and sectors.
- Fair share calculations for finance have never gained traction under the UNFCCC;
- Analysis limited to independent actors. Important that it is articulated in ETF.
- First GST to rely on the existing biennial reporting system created under the Paris Agreement and Cancun Agreements for Transparency.

# Elements of ETF need equity and fairness

#### Reporting

 Common tables and format (as suggested in the Rulebook) for reporting might be difficult if not unachievable for all the parties

#### Review/Monitoring

• Should there be common pattern and method of measurement of progress? Should it follow differentiated obligations and capacities to facilitate measurement and achievement of targets.

#### **Capacity Building**

- Developing nations need capacity building for reporting and monitoring like GHG inventory calculations, etc.
- Also, training programs for technical review is required

# Finance/ Support need

 The CBDR&RC principle is applicable. ETF must ensure financial and technological transfer to developing countries in a transparent manner.

# Relationship between ETF and GST

**Purpose of Article 13:**To provide understanding and clarity on:


#### Paragraph 5:

- climate change action in the light of the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2;
- tracking of progress towards achieving Parties' individual NDCs (under Article 4),
- adaptation actions under Art 7, including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps,
- to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.

#### Paragraph 6:

- support provided and received by relevant individual Parties in the context of climate change actions under Articles 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11, and,
- aggregate financial support provided,
- to inform the global stocktake under Article 14.

# **EQUITY-BASED GLOBAL STOCKTAKE**



- CO2 development and emission curve at GDP per capita in different era is shown in the figure.
- GDP per capita of developed countries on an average remains more than that of developing countries, with an increasing gap
- Hence, equity considerations must be adequately addressed in GST. Developed countries to undertake a larger share of the global mitigation efforts, in response to their historical responsibility for contribution to the largest share of global GHG emissions.

Source: South Centre, 2019

# Operationalizing Equity in the ETF and GST:

### Equity is about:

- reflecting on and including fairness in both, the process of the ETF and the outcome of the GST.
- link the GST to the purpose of the Paris Agreement (Art. 2.1) and;
- Flexibility in reporting and review of ETF in accordance with the goals of the NDC;
- principles under which ETF/GST should be implemented (Art. 2.2); and
- a cross-cutting and overarching consideration in the GST;

# THANK YOU



# Masumur Rahman South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP)





# Transitioning from BURs to BTRs "Challengers and Opportunities for South Asian Countries"




Dr.Md. Masumur Rahman, Director General, SACEP

South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) www.sacep.org

## South Asia- Overview...

- Consists of 8 countries; Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
- Makes less than 5% of the world's land area and hosts nearly a quarter of the world population.
- Home for about 1.9 billion people with different civilizations sharing diverse geological, cultural, political, economical and environmental patterns
- About 14% of the region's urban population, totaling about 400 million, live in coastal and major river delta areas that are 10 meters or less above sea level.
- Although rapidly urbanizing, South Asia is still predominantly an agrarian society, where a majority of the population is dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods.
- Even though the eight countries are located in a contiguous region, they differ greatly both in terms of geographic characteristics as well as demographic, political, social, and economic characteristics.




















#### **Observed Climate Trends in South Asia**

- Climate change is one of the most important environmental, social and economic issues faced by the countries in South Asia today,
- It is one of the most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change.
- > Sea level rise
- > Increases of frequency and severity of floods
- > Rapid desertification
- > Increase of incidents in wild forest fire
- ➤ Melting of the Hindu Kush and Himalayan glaciers
- > Loss of biodiversity and Increasing food insecurity









# **SACEP** and its Priorities

- South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) is an intergovernmental organization, established in 1982
- To promote and support protection, management and enhancement of the environment in the region.





- SACEP priority areas
  - Climate Change
  - ➤ Waste Management
  - ➤ Sustainable Consumption and Production
  - Biodiversity
  - > Air Quality
  - > Environmental Governance
- ➤ Climate Change is one of the key areas concerned in the region and since then, it has been in the SACEP's work programme as a priority area







## Status of Submission of NDCs by SACEP member countries



- The Nationally Determined Contributions
   (NDCs) are at the heart of the Paris Agreement.
   They constitute each country's approach to
   emission reduction and climate change
   adaptation,
- All SACEP member countries through their National Focal Points to the UNFCCC, have submitted their first NDCs
- Bangladesh (Updated), Bhutan (Second), India (Updated), Maldives (updated), Nepal (Second), Pakistan (updated), Sri Lanka (updated)

Country	Submission Date
Afghanistan	23 <sup>rd</sup> November 2016
Bangladesh	21 <sup>st</sup> September 2016
Bhutan	19 <sup>th</sup> September 2017
India	o2 <sup>nd</sup> October 2016
Maldives	22 <sup>nd</sup> April 2016
Nepal	o5 <sup>th</sup> October 2016
Pakistan	10 <sup>th</sup> November 2016
Sri Lanka	o6 <sup>th</sup> November 2016

### Biennial Update Reports (BURs)

- In South Asia 04 countries including
   Afghanistan, India, Maldives, and Pakistan
   have submitted their BURs.
- Among these, India has submitted its Third BUR whereas Afghanistan, Maldives and Pakistan have submitted their first BUR.

#### Biennial Transparency Report (BTR),

- MPGs adopted at the COP24 call for Parties to submit Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) including the NIR, to be submitted every two years
- The BTR will supersede the BUR for Parties to the Paris Agreement, at the latest by the end of 2024
- Transitioning to the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) requires developing countries to enhance their national reporting systems to be more systematic and sustainable



			SAC
Afghanistan	BUR1 13 Oct 2019 NIR 1 Mar 2020		
India	BUR1 22 Jan 2016	BUR2 31 Dec 2018 (Includes Errata submitted on 30 Jan 2019)	BUR3 20 Feb 2021
Maldives	BUR1 20 Oct 2020 (Original submission date: 24 Nov 2019)		

28 Apr 2022

Pakistan

# Common gaps identified in the existing institutional arrangements in South Asia

➤ lack of stable and permanent institutional arrangements at the national level



- ➤ Lack of coordination between the relevant stakeholders and the national coordination body
- ➤ Lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities
- >In-country technical and Institutional capacity limitations
- > Lack of communication between stakeholders
- ➤ Lack of political will
- ➤ Lack of Awareness/Information base

# Challenges with quality and quantity of data

- > Lack of data
- Lack of availability of data that is inconsistent or not sourced properly.
- Lack collection, storage, and retrieval of data
- Higher costs for data processing and analysis
- Complexities regarding the ownership of data
- No common platform for data sharing

# Role of SACEP as a Regional Organization



- An effective transparency mechanism under the Paris Agreement requires accurate and precise MRV of GHG emissions from all participating Parties.
- A regional approach is considered an effective
- With the assistance of UNFCCC, ICAT, PATPA and other donor agencies SACEP provides an ideal platform for South Asian countries to
  - Share information and experiences among different countries to enable completeness and quality of information and effectiveness in transparency reporting.
  - Strengthen national institutions for transparency-related activities in line with national priorities.
  - **build capacities** of member countries on understanding and applying tools and approaches to measure, report and verify (MRV) greenhouse gas emissions reductions and adaptation action.
  - **Provide relative training and assistance** to member states to strengthen existing institutional arrangements and processes for MRV of policies and actions.
  - **Provide peer-to-peer learning opportunities** in preparing for the submission of the BTRs by the deadline of 2024

# Thank You





## Emily Ojoo-Massawa

Mott MacDonald & African Climate and Development Initiative (ACDI) at the University of Cape Town (UCT)









# Towards transformative climate action

# & the enhance transparency framework inclusive NDCs in Africa

COP 27 Side Event, November 15 2022

Emily Massawa & Britta Rennkamp,

African Climate and Development Initiative

University of Cape Town













#### TRANSPARENCY UNDER THE UNFCCC AND ITS AGREEMENTS

- The UNFCCC (Article 12) requires all Parties to submit regular national reports, in the form of National Communications (NCs). Parties to pursue mitigation efforts following to their "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities" (CBDR-RC).
- Distinction between the information required for Annex I and non-Annex I. Kyoto Protocol introduced more transparency requirements for developed countries, given the crucial role of emissions accounting for the environmental integrity of the treaty
- PA puts in place ETF for reporting and review. This supersedes over time the existing transparency arrangements. Parties must communicate successive NDCs that represent a progression in ambition and reflect the "highest possible ambition" with respect to their CBDR-RC. Developed countries(not named) to take the lead in mitigating economy-wide emissions and in mobilizing climate finance.
- Framework for transparency of Action(13.5)-Aims to provide clarity on the climate actions taken by Parties, including progress made towards achieving NDCs
- The framework for transparency of support (Article 13.6) aims to provide clarity on support provided and/or received by individual countries in the context of climate actions.
- Impacts of climate variability and change are exacerbating global inequalities between countries and within societies. Vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change differ significantly between and within the countries.
- In Africa recurring droughts and extreme weather events jeopardize socio-economic development and vulnerable livelihoods. Provision and access to basic services is affected as new climate technologies have not been diffused at large scale to ensure security in supply of essential services.
- **NDCs** climate action plans that were submitted to the UNFCCC during the lead-up to the Paris Agreement in 2015 and now being updated. They are 'nationally determined' -plan to limit the growth of GHG emissions and adaptation plans, an outline of national circumstances, and a description of the funds needed to carry out their plans.
- few countries have indicated which equity principle they used to derive their mitigation contributions, simply declared their NDCs are "fair and ambitious". No effort-sharing mechanism to determine the contribution of each country

  This project is made possible with the support of
- Participation?






#### Transforming Social Inequalities through Inclusive Climate Action

"Enhancing climate action" requires understanding multi-dimensionality in climate governance and inequalities

- → Actors, relationships, political representation
- → Multi-dimensional inequalities in space and time
- → Place based evidence

Figure 2 Multidimensionality in Climate Governance and Inequality



Recognitional Inequalities: Who is in and who is left out of the climate policy arena?

Procedural Inequalities: Who is recognised as an actor in climate policy processes? Who has access, who is left out?

Distributional inequalities: Who benefits from NDCs? Who experiences disadvantages from climate action?

Source: own compilation based on LSE 2018








#### Transforming Social Inequalities through Inclusive Climate Action

- Building evidence for "national determination" in support of the reporting under the Transparency mechanism.
- Understanding in inequalities in representation and vulnerability.
- Enhance climate action through transparency in the implementation of the NDC

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https://arua-cd.org/call-for-papers-arua-climate-change-and-inequalities-symposium/

en the countries in the Global North and South. Local research is critical to solutions to novel development challenges in Africa.

Fig. 1. Model of a discourse network.









#### Romain Weikmans

Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) and Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)



# Transparency and Climate Finance

"The prospects and challenges of the Enhanced Transparency Framework as a driver of climate ambition" COP27 Side Event, 15 November 2022

**Dr Romain WEIKMANS** 



By revealing information on climate finance provisions, the general expectation is that transparency could stimulate developing countries to increase the ambition of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). **But how?** 

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#### **Ex-post transparency (on past provision of climate finance)**

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- → So if transparency can help bring clarity on and confidence in the validity of the claims of climate finance amounts delivered, it could certainly stimulate climate ambition...
- → But if transparency reveals that the amounts delivered are not aligned with expectations/promises/needs, it could also lead to less climate ambition in the future! (In that sense, transparency is a double-edged sword!)

By revealing information on climate finance provisions, the general expectation is that transparency could stimulate developing countries to increase the ambition of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). **But how?** 

#### **Ex-ante transparency (on future provision of climate finance)**

- → Transparency on the future provision of climate finance may encourage developing countries to strengthen the ambition of their future NDCs if they have confidence that their climate action will receive support.
- → But it could also discourage more ambition if it is clear that future climate finance provisions will be insufficient.

#### Two questions

 Does the current transparency framework brings confidence in the validity of the claims of climate finance amounts delivered?

• Will the Paris Agreement's Enhanced Transparency Framework improve that confidence?

#### Two questions

- Does the current transparency framework brings confidence in the validity of the claims of climate finance amounts delivered?
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EDITORIAL | 06 January 2021 | Correction <u>08 January 2021</u>

## Global climate action needs trusted finance data

An agreed system for measuring funding of green projects in poorer nations will be vital to achieving action on climate change in 2021.

#### theguardian

Paris climate talks: Indian officials accuse OECD of exaggerating climate aid

Economic ministry paper says OECD claims about the amount of money mobilised to help developing nations adapt to climate change are 'deeply flawed'



(i) India's chief climate negotiator, Ravi Prasad, has called for the Paris agreement to be 'just, equitable, durable and ambitious'. Photograph: Courtesy of IISD

# Four conflicting sets of estimates on public climate finance from developed to developing countries

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
OECD (2022)	38	43.5	42.1	46.9	54.1	62.5	63.4	68.3
Annex II Parties' Biennial Reports to UNFCCC (2020)	26.1*		35.3*		36.2*		N.A.	
Oxfam (2020)	11-21*		15-19.5*		19-22.5*		N.A.	
Indian Ministry of Finance (2015)	1-2.2*		N.A.					

All figures in US\$ billion. \*Yearly average.
Updated from Roberts et al. (2021). Last updated on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 2022.

The huge differences in numbers are mostly linked to three issues:

1. Most developed countries count all financial instruments (loans, grants, investments, insurance) at face value in their reporting to the UNFCCC.

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- In practice, this means that those developed countries that provide a large part of their climate finance in the form of loans get their figures "inflated" in comparison with those countries that mainly provide climate finance as grants.
- Developing country negotiators and civil society representatives argue that only the grant equivalent of loans should be counted as actual support.

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- Current accounting methodologies tend to lead to huge overestimations: far fewer projects than developed countries report as "climate finance" can genuinely be considered as such.

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- Multilateral development banks have their own accounting system.
- Current accounting methodologies tend to lead to huge overestimations: far fewer projects than developed countries report as "climate finance" can genuinely be considered as such.
- Accounting methodologies used by some countries have changed over time, complicating any assessment of trends.

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- 3. The long-standing issue of whether funds are 'new and additional', as has been promised since 1992, has not been resolved.
- What is commonly referred to by developed countries as concessional public climate finance almost always counts towards the well-known 0.7% target of donors' national income to be devoted to ODA.
- As most developed countries do not reach this 0.7% target, many developing country negotiators and civil society observers argue that a large proportion of reported climate finance cannot be considered 'new and additional' – an accusation frequently rejected by developed countries who have their own understandings of those terms.




Fig. 1 | Two examples of scaling down of OECD climate finance estimates. Values indicate billions of total US\$ estimated to be actually flowing from developed nations to developing nations.

Source: Roberts et al. (2021, p. 181).

Key Accounting Issues Pre-Paris
Transparency

Framework

1. Most developed countries count all financial instruments (loans, grants, investments, insurance) at face value.

2. Bilateral and multilateral funding flows are screened by completely different methods for whether they count as climate finance.



3. The long-standing issue of whether funds are 'new and additional' has not been resolved.



Key Accounting Issues	Pre-Paris Transparency Framework	Post-Paris Transparency Framework
1. Most developed countries count all financial instruments (loans, grants, investments, insurance) at face value.	8	8
2. Bilateral and multilateral funding flows are screened by completely different methods for whether they count as climate finance.	8	8
3. The long-standing issue of whether funds are 'new and additional' has not been resolved.	8	8

- Does the current transparency framework brings confidence in the validity of the claims of climate finance amounts delivered?
   No!
- Will the Paris Agreement's Enhanced Transparency Framework improve confidence in the validity of the claims of climate finance amounts delivered?

No!

 Does the current transparency framework brings confidence in the validity of the claims of climate finance amounts delivered?
 No!

• Will the Paris Agreement's Enhanced Transparency Framework improve confidence in the validity of the claims of climate finance amounts delivered?

No!

→ It seems unlikely that the new transparency arrangements on climate finance will stimulate developing countries to increase their climate ambition.

#### nature climate change

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Comment | Published: 18 February 2021

#### Rebooting a failed promise of climate finance

J. Timmons Roberts , Romain Weikmans, Stacy-ann Robinson, David Ciplet, Mizan Khan & Danielle Falzon

Nature Climate Change 11, 180–182 (2021) Cite this article

12k Accesses | 35 Citations | 490 Altmetric | Metrics

The 2009 pledge to mobilize US\$100 billion a year by 2020 in climate finance to developing nations was not specific on what types of funding could count.

Indeterminacy and questionable claims make it impossible to know if developed nations have delivered; as 2020 passes, opportunity exists to address these failures in a new pledge.

#### **Recent Publications on Climate Finance**

- Pauw, W.P., Moslener, U., Zamarioli, L., (...), & Weikmans, R. 2022. **Post-2025 climate finance target: How much more and how much better?** *Climate Policy*, doi: 10.1080/14693062.2022.2114985.
- Roberts, J.T., Weikmans, R., Robinson, S.-a., (...), & Falzon, D. 2021. **Rebooting a failed promise of climate finance.** *Nature Climate Change*, doi:10.1038/s41558-021-00990-2.
- Weikmans, R., Roberts, J.T., & Robinson, S.-a. 2020. What counts as climate finance? **Define urgently**. *Nature*, doi: 10.1038/d41586-020-03481-0.
- Khan, M., Robinson, S.-A., Weikmans, R., (...), & Roberts, J.T. 2020. **Twenty-five years of adaptation finance through a climate justice lens**. *Climatic Change*, doi: 10.1007/s10584-019-02563-x.
- Weikmans, R, & Roberts, J. T. 2019. **The climate finance accounting muddle: Is there hope on the horizon?** *Climate and Development*, doi: 10.1080/17565529.2017.1410087.
- Weikmans, R., & Roberts, J. T. 2018. **It's déjà vu all over again: Climate finance at COP24** *Brookings Planet Policy*, December 6, 2018.
- Weikmans, R, Roberts, J. T., Baum, J., (...), & Durand, A. 2017. **Assessing the credibility** of how climate adaptation aid projects are categorised. *Development in Practice*, doi: 10.1080/09614524.2017.1307325.

## Thank you for your attention.

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# THE PARTNERSHIP FOR GOVERNANCE REFORM

#### **MAINSTREAMING GENDER IN ACCELERATING CLIMATE ACTIONS:**

GRASS-ROOTS COLLABORATIONS, AS PART OF ENHANCED TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK

Laode M. Syarif, Ph.D

Executive Director
KEMITRAAN – Partnership for Governance Reforms

## GENDER ASPECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE



Comprehensive gender assessment

Establishment of gender focal point at grass-root level

Ensure full inclusion of women in decision making process


Provision of information of accessible financing (capital, loan)

Involve women in innovative technological application

Effective gender related information strategies



## GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN ETF





## KEMITRAAN'S COMMITMENT

Gender mainstreaming has been an important aspect for KEMITRAAN in implementing climate projects. To this, KEMITRAAN involve gender inclusion right from the beginning of project development process and throughout the project implementation through:

- Initial gender assessment,
- Provision of segregated beneficiaries' data,
- Identification of existing women groups to involve in the project,
- Ensuring women involvement at least 30% of all participants,
- Related to the above, ensuring women involvement in the decision-making process,
- Establishment of women business groups and support with necessary skills and equipment,
- Strengthen involvement of youth and youth groups to accelerate climate action,
- Training of women and youth in the utilization of technological appliances,
- Provide room and assist women to speak amongst them in raising concerns and hopes for the future development.



#### CHALLENGES VS OPPORTUNITIES

FORMALITY PARTICIPATION	MEANINGFUL PARTICPATION			
Letter of Acknowledgment	INFORM			
No Objection Letter	CONSULT			
Stakeholders mapping	INVOLVE			
Guided Formal Meeting	COLLABORATE			
Survey/Questioner	EMPOWER (MAKING DECITION)			

"Meaningful participation is dependent on people being willing and able to participate and express their voice". Alan Stanley: <a href="https://www.eldis.org/keyissues/what-participation">https://www.eldis.org/keyissues/what-participation</a>



# AF PROJECTS: CONCRETE ACTIONS




Women Business Group, Saddang

Home yard farming, Bulukumba









#### **CONCLUSION NOTE**

"ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK (ETF) should not only obligated to the national governments up to project level, but the same requirement should also applied to the whole operation of all climate change management at international and regional levels"


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#### THANK YOU – TERIMA KASIH







## Q&A



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# Thank you for your participation!

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